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I. LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF MORAL CONTROVERSY1 
Imagine a community living in a defined geographical area.  Its members
generally believe that their actions should be guided by moral norms, 
and they generally comply with those norms as they understand them. 
And, from our external vantage point, we believe that they are indeed 
subject to moral norms and should comply with them, both in dealing
with each other and with those outside their community. 
This community, however, lacks something important to its moral 
welfare. It lacks a mechanism for authoritative settlement of moral
controversies—those controversies that inevitably arise over just what
the governing moral norms are and how they apply in various factual 
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of
Law.  I want to thank Jack Goldsmith, Daryl Levinson, Frank Michelman, and, most
particularly, Michael Ramsey for their constructive and instructive comments.
1. The arguments in the next eleven paragraphs are more fully elaborated in
LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES chs. 1–4 (2001). 
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circumstances, as well as controversies that inevitably arise over what
the factual circumstances are in which they find themselves.  These
controversies can produce huge costs. 
First, they impede coordination with others.  What Alpha believes he 
is morally obligated to do will often depend upon what he believes Beta 
will do.  If Alpha’s understanding of moral norms and factual circumstances 
differs from Beta’s, then it is likely that Alpha will fail to predict Beta’s 
actions, and vice versa.  And this failure will often mean that they will fail
to coordinate their actions and end up failing to do what they, by their 
own lights, believe is morally optimal. Moral and factual controversies 
produce failures of coordination, which in turn produce moral costs. 
Second, moral controversies can lead to violence.  Alpha believes he 
has a right to put a dam on the river through his land.  Beta, downstream, 
believes that he has a right to unimpeded flow.  Both refuse to compromise 
and stand on their rights. Alpha builds the dam, and Beta, believing he 
has a right to use self-help to defend his rights, attempts to destroy 
Alpha’s dam.  Alpha attempts to prevent it.  You get the picture.  The 
resulting struggle is morally suboptimal on either’s account of morality.
And third, moral controversies may produce moral costs due to lack of 
factual expertise. Alpha believes he has a moral obligation not to pollute 
the river, but he also believes that the pesticide he sprays on his crops is
not a pollutant.  Beta believes it is. Alpha and Beta both lack scientific 
expertise. Alpha believes that the costs in time and material resources
required for him to obtain expert opinion about his pesticide are greater 
than the material costs his pesticide will cause if he sprays.  He therefore
sprays without getting such an opinion.  He turns out to be wrong about 
the pesticide. 
Authoritative settlement of these controversies will be a moral benefit 
to this hypothetical community.  By authoritative settlement, I mean a 
decision by some person or institution that is accepted by the community
as definitive of what they are obligated to do.  By each of their moral
lights, a mechanism for authoritative settlement will be morally preferable 
to its absence; or at least that is so within a range of possible such 
mechanisms.  (Some mechanisms, such as a dictatorship, drawing straws, or
rule by the least educated, will appear to be morally worse than anarchy.) 
Now how exactly do mechanisms for authoritative settlement eliminate or 
reduce the moral costs of lack of coordination, violence, and expertise? If
the authoritative settling institution issued only the “Spike Lee” edict— 
“Henceforth, everyone shall on every occasion do the right thing”—the
community’s moral situation will not have improved.  For it is precisely 
controversy over what “the right thing” is that creates the need for 
settlement. Thus, the Spike Lee edict fails to settle. 
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What settlement requires are norms that are more determinate and thus 
less controversial in terms of their content and their applications than are
the moral norms themselves.  Settlement requires concrete decisions 
(“Beta has a right to enjoin Alpha’s dam”) and determinate rules (“None
of the following pesticides may be used within a quarter mile of a 
river”). 
Note now the looming paradox.  Rules and decisions representing 
authoritative settlements will only perform their moral functions by
simplifying moral requirements.  Thus, what these rules and decisions 
dictate will diverge in a range of cases from what morality requires.  But
these rules and decisions can only perform their moral function and 
authoritatively settle what ought to be done if those persons subject to 
them look only to them and not to the moral norms on which they are 
based. (Otherwise, the very moral controversies that necessitated them
would arise again.) 
If we call “law” those rules that represent authoritative settlements of 
what to do, then law’s moral function is to exclude morality from its 
subjects’ consideration in determining what to do.  But in so doing, law 
will inevitably diverge from morality and thus dictate actions that are 
morally wrong or morally suboptimal.  And if moral reasons are always
supreme, then we, as rule subjects, will have moral reasons to depart 
from rules of authoritative settlement that we, as authorities, have moral
reasons to promulgate. We thus have an inevitable “gap” between the
requirements of the rules we morally should establish and the requirements 
of morality—a gap that I do not believe can be closed. 
Some might think that if we have moral reasons to promulgate
authoritative rules—that is, if we have moral reasons to have “law”— 
then surely we must have moral reasons to follow its dictates.  Now it is 
true that if Alpha’s disobeying law would lead to law’s authoritativeness 
being completely undermined, then Alpha would have a moral reason to 
obey law that would override any moral reason he might have to disobey
it. (I continue to assume that the mechanisms of authoritative settlement
produce laws that fall within a range of moral acceptability that makes 
them preferable to anarchy.)  And in many cases, the moral benefits of
disobedience will be outweighed by the moral costs of undermining 
lawfulness in others.  But there is a difference between “it’s right 
because of the effects of violating the law” and “it’s right because it’s 
the law.” If everyone reasons the first way, authoritative settlement has
not occurred. And the same moral costs that authoritative settlement
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was meant to avert will arise, for everyone will know that everyone else 
is still reasoning morally rather than accepting the law as conclusive of 
their obligations.  Therefore, the cost of undermining lawfulness will be 
nil, lawfulness never having been truly established. 
Nor does the “incorporation” of morality into law offer a way out of 
this practical dilemma.2  The typical way morality is incorporated into 
law is in the form of standards. Standards can be characterized as: “Do 
what is morally best within the space bounded by legal rules and subordinated
to authoritative decisions regarding how the standard applies.”  In other 
words, in standards, morality operates only in the interstices of what has 
been authoritatively decided.  Morality is treated by the law as legally 
subordinate—as one would expect. 
But some believe that “the gap” can be closed by making consistency 
with morality a necessary or sufficient condition of legal validity.  And 
indeed, doing so would eliminate “the gap,” but it would do so by
eliminating authoritative settlement and hence, law. For then the same 
moral controversies for which law is the moral antidote would resurface
in the form of legal controversies.  The reason this is often overlooked is 
that those who assert some moral test for legal validity assume that there
will be an authoritative decision reached regarding whether that moral
test has been satisfied.  However, if morality really were a test of legality, 
then no decision regarding whether that test were satisfied would itself
settle the matter authoritatively.  For the decision itself would be valid 
only if it were consistent with morality, and the original moral
controversy would continue. 
II.  LAW AND CONSTITUTIONS
What would be necessary for us to say of this community—or any
other community—not only that it had “law,” but also that it had a 
“constitution”? Put differently, what distinguishes ordinary law from 
constitutional law? 
In my view, there is no noncontroversial distinction between ordinary 
law and constitutions, at least if the constitutions we are discussing go 
beyond the hortatory or precatory and purport legally to obligate.  Both
ordinary law and constitutions are the products of authoritative 
settlement.3  Constitutions could be distinguished from ordinary law on 
either of two axes: in terms of relative position on the chain of validity 
2. The arguments of the next two paragraphs are more fully elaborated in Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law’s Limited Domain Confronts Morality’s Universal
Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1579 (2007). 
3. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 1, at ch. 3. 
46
ALEXANDER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2009 10:13 AM     
 
























    
   
    
  
[VOL. 11:  43, 2009] A Schema for Further Reflection 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
or in terms of relative entrenchment.4 The United States Constitution, 
for example, is both higher on the validity chain than statutory law and
treaties, which are themselves higher on the validity chain than, say, 
administrative rules, common law decisions, and state and local
statutes.5  (Of course, one could look at parts of the U.S. Constitution— 
the amendments—as being lower on the validity chain than the original 
Constitution, which contains Article V and its rules governing adoption 
of amendments,6 just as one could view Article VII, governing the
ratification of the Constitution, as higher on the validity chain than the 
rest of the Constitution.7 On the other hand, once Article V or Article 
VII has been complied with, one might say that those measures adopted 
in pursuance of their terms now rank equally high on the validity chain.) 
Alternatively, constitutions might be distinguished from ordinary law 
by relative degrees of entrenchment against change.  Again, the U.S. 
Constitution is more entrenched than are statutes, administrative rules,
and other non-constitutional law. 
Most frequently, as with the U.S. Constitution, rank on the validity
chain and degree of entrenchment go hand in hand.  It is theoretically
possible to have the ultimate rules governing validity be easier to change 
than some of the rules they validate, and I have been told that is the case 
in some countries.  But it is easy to see why that might prove impractical. If
one had a relatively entrenched lower level rule and a relatively un-
entrenched higher level one, the former could be repealed merely by
taking the easier route of repealing the latter (and then reinstating the
latter once repeal of the former had been accomplished).8 
4. See Larry Alexander, Constitutions, Judicial Review, Moral Rights, and
Democracy: Disentangling the Issues, in  EXPOUNDING THE CONSTITUTION 119 (Grant 
Huscroft ed., 2008); Larry Alexander, Constitutionalism, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 283 (Thomas Christiano & John Christman eds., 2009); 
Constitutionalism and Democracy: Understanding the Relation, in THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 161 (S. Kautz et al. eds., 2009). 
5. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
6. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
7. See Michael Steven Green, Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes about Discontinuity in
the Legal Order, 83 N.C. L. REV. 331 (2004). 
8. See supra note 4.
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Thus far, I have discussed law and morality only as they relate to a
single hypothetical community.  But because my topic is international 
law and its relation to domestic constitutions, I shall now widen my lens 
and assume the existence of other communities.
The most important feature of this inter-community view is that 
fundamentally, it is not different from the intra-community one.  When
they interact, people from different communities are subject to the same
moral norms as they are when they interact within their own communities.
Justice and “the Right” govern all human interactions without regard to
geography, ethnicity, religion, and the like—although Justice and the 
Right might be sensitive to these and various other human differences in
their application.  And if Justice and the Right dictate that, within a 
range, promises be kept and that reasonable expectations not be dashed, 
those obligations are applicable to both individual and communal acts 
vis-à-vis individuals from other communities and those communities 
themselves. 
What is also true when we adopt the international perspective is that 
the same moral imperative to establish mechanisms for authoritative 
settlement of moral controversies operates, though perhaps with less 
force. Recall that authoritative settlement mechanisms are morally 
preferable to their absence only if they are sufficiently reliable so that 
they risk less moral error than will occur in their absence.  If the 
proposed institutions for authoritative settlement are too prone to moral
or factual errors, or too likely to be despotic, oppressive, or corrupt, 
international anarchy may seem morally preferable.  And this is particularly
the case if the community whose acceptance of international settlement
mechanisms at issue is quite confident in its own moral views, militarily 
strong enough to deter violent conflict with others over moral 
controversies, and distrustful of mechanisms of authoritative settlement
beyond its control. Because the very purpose of authoritative settlement
is to exclude moral considerations in determining what one should do 
and to make the terms of the authoritative settlement conclusive of the 
matter, setting up any mechanism for authoritative settlement involves 
moral risk.  The risk may be worth running in return for the moral 
benefits of settlement in the case of intra-community moral conflict.  But
the risk may be greater and the benefits smaller in international relations, 
especially for the militarily strong and morally confident.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AUTHORITATIVE SETTLEMENT
The function of law is to settle moral controversy.  Law tells us what 
we are obligated to do (and how to alter, when it is possible, what we are
obligated to do).  Law therefore occupies the same terrain as morality, 
which law must exclude from consideration by law’s subjects when they
determine how they should act given a legal norm covering the matter. 
If law did not purport to be conclusive of subjects’ moral duties and
rights on the matters it regulates, law could not accomplish its function 
of settling moral controversy.  That does not mean, of course, that in 
drafting laws, lawmakers should not advert to morality.  That would be 
absurd. What it does mean is that law’s subjects are expected to follow 
the law and not morality even if they believe the law’s dictates differ 
from morality’s. 
I repeat this account of law because it bears on the status of 
international law.  Some believe that international law is oxymoronic 
because of the absence of international mechanisms of enforcement.
Whether there is such an absence I will put aside because the premise of
this argument is incorrect.  Law’s existence does not depend on institutions
of enforcement. It depends only on acceptance of mechanisms for
authoritative settlement.  (Law is necessary because we are not all-knowing 
gods, not because we are not angels.)9  And if there are transnational 
mechanisms that have been accepted as mechanisms of authoritative 
settlement, then within the scope of their accepted authority, there is
international law.
For there to be international law, then, there must be acceptance by 
those subject to it of the mechanisms by which their obligations are 
authoritatively determined.  Those mechanisms might include not only
institutions that legislate or that declare the content of the obligations, 
but also institutions that adjudicate the meaning and application of those 
obligations when their meaning or application is controverted.  (The same 
institutions might serve both as law-makers/declarers and as adjudicators, as
common law courts do in countries with common law.) 
9. See Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin,’”: Formalism in Law and 
Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 539, 549 (1999). 
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Now, is there in fact international law?  As I understand the matter— 
and I am sure this is highly oversimplified—international law is deemed
to have the following sources: treaties and other agreements among
nations; behavior of nations that generates binding norms; and perhaps 
the declarations of international tribunals, organizations, and intellectuals. 
Norms generated by the last two sources are called customary
international law.10 
Treaties are relatively unproblematic.  It is generally accepted that 
people can assume obligations by some procedure for tokening the 
assumption of obligations.  “I promise” is, of course, the commonplace
method. 
There are moral limits to the obligations we can assume and to which
others can hold us. “I promise to commit murder”; “I promise to give 
you money that belongs to another”; “I promise to pollute the atmosphere”:
these promises do not produce obligations in the promisor or rights in
the promisee. 
What holds for natural persons also holds for corporate bodies, including
states, though not without some complications.  An assumption of obligations
by a state, for example, may be quite just and morally permissible vis-à-
vis other states but unjust vis-à-vis some of the promisor state’s own 
citizens.  (Think of odious debts incurred by nations governed despotically
for the benefit of the despot and his cronies.)  Still, there may be indirect
consequentialist reasons to deem a state morally bound to its agreements
even when those agreements work some injustices internally. If one’s
state could not bind itself to its agreements internationally, were any one of
its citizens wronged by its compliance, then it would be unlikely to be 
viewed by other states as a reliable treaty partner, and everyone might be
worse off as a consequence.  Indeed, treating treaties as binding might 
have the identical indirect consequentialist justification as law in general:
Just as authoritative settlements will depart from what morality would 
directly dictate but yet be morally preferable to their absence, so too 
might the authority to enter binding treaties. 
In the United States, of course, there are legal limits to the binding 
force of treaties. The President and the Senate cannot bind the United
States to treaty obligations that conflict with the Constitution, at least as 
a matter of United States law.11 Reid v. Covert12 makes that clear. 
10. See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
IN A NUTSHELL 18−34 (2007).
11. As a matter of international law, however, our treaty obligations may be 
regarded as binding by other nations even if those obligations exceed constitutional 
limits on the treaty power.  However, because we, the people of the United States, have
not accepted constitutionally ultra vires treaties as authoritative settlements of our
50
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(Missouri v. Holland,13 however, raises the question of how far the treaty 
authority extends with respect to the Constitution’s federal structure.) 
These constitutional limits on treaty obligations are not coterminous 
with, but are much less restrictive than moral limits on treaty obligations. 
The President and Senate have constitutional authority to bind the
United States to quite iniquitous obligations, whether iniquitous to 
foreigners or to citizens.  Of course, they should not do so and would rightly 
be censured if they did.  But they are constitutionally at liberty to enter 
into any treaty that is not violative of constitutional constraints.  And, as 
argued previously, just as there are good moral reasons to have authoritative
settlement mechanisms—law—that may deviate from the morally
optimal in what they prescribe, there may be good moral reasons for the 
President and Senate to be able to bind the country in ways that are 
morally unfortunate, especially given that there are constitutional limits 
on the treaty power. 
In terms of their status as domestic law of the United States, treaties,
at least if they are self-executing, are constitutionally on a par with
federal statutes.14  They are supreme over inconsistent state laws but, as 
mentioned above, inferior to the Constitution.  With respect to laws of 
equal status—other treaties and federal statutes—the “last in time” rule
of superiority prevails.15 
At this point I should say a word about the concept of “sovereignty.” 
Although there are several accounts of sovereignty on offer, I choose to 
characterize sovereignty in terms of the accepted mechanisms for
authoritative settlement.  If those mechanisms are all contained within a 
given community, then the community is legally obligated only by laws 
of its own making. (Its moral obligations are, of course, another story.) 
I regard such a community as fully sovereign. 
Are treaties consistent with the full sovereignty of the United States? 
Well, in one sense, they are. After all, they are subordinate to the 
Constitution. Moreover, even if their terms do not permit unilateral
international obligations, those obligations are not international law from our perspective.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
12. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (striking down action taken in pursuance of 
a treaty but in violation of the Bill of Rights). 
13. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding federal enforcement of a 
treaty covering matters beyond Congress’s enumerated powers). 
14. See supra note 5.
15. See  MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
166−68 (2007). 
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termination, as a domestic matter, they may be abrogated by the 
President or by a later statute.16 
Still, treaties that do not permit unilateral termination may continue to 
obligate the United States as a matter of international law even if the 
treaty has been abrogated domestically by the President or by a later
inconsistent statute. Even so, that continuing international obligation
cannot be considered inconsistent with the full sovereignty of the United
States. After all, it was acquired as a result of voluntary actions taken in 
pursuance of, and consistently with, the Constitution.  Just as contractual
obligations are consistent with an expression of the autonomy of the
individual contractors, so too are treaty obligations consistent with 
national sovereignty.
Suppose, finally, that a treaty negotiated by the President and ratified 
by the Senate were to delegate the authority to declare international 
obligations on some topics to some supranational tribunal.  Would that
treaty be consistent with full sovereignty of the United States, and would
it be constitutionally valid? 
Let us distinguish two types of delegations to supranational institutions
and two types of legal consequences.  The two types of delegations are
delegations to interpret voluntary commitments and delegations to enact
or declare obligations (that cannot be traced to voluntary commitments). 
The two types of legal consequences are those for the domestic law of 
the United States and those for international law. 
Treaty delegations to international tribunals that are to interpret the
treaty obligations are probably within the constitutional authority of the 
President and Senate. And if the treaty obligations are self-executing, or 
Congress has passed the requisite legislation, then the international 
tribunal’s interpretations would be enforceable domestically by U.S. 
courts. (I withhold judgment on whether a treaty could bind U.S. courts
to follow a treaty interpretation by a supranational body that the U.S. 
courts regard as erroneous and unreasonable.) 
So long as the delegation concerns interpretation, it is consistent with 
the full sovereignty of the United States; the United States would be
bound only by the obligations it has voluntarily assumed through
processes accepted as authoritatively settling how it can do so. 
Consider, now, treaties that delegate law-enacting or law-declaring 
authority to some international tribunal.  (I consider law-declaring to be 
tantamount to law-enactment if the declaration is based on factors other
than the voluntary assumption of obligations.)  Were such a treaty
constitutionally valid, it would appear to represent the voluntary
16. Id. at 155–73. 
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surrendering of full U.S. sovereignty. After all, as a consequence of such
a treaty, authoritative settlement of what the United States, its citizens,
or both, are obligated to do would now be determined by foreigners.
This matter is perhaps more complicated, however.  If the delegation
of law-enactment authority is retractable—the treaty can be terminated
at any time—then the delegation is probably consistent with retention of 
full sovereignty, especially if termination deprives the international law-
enacting body of any authority to determine either U.S. domestic law or 
U.S. international (legal) obligations. (Matters are less clear if treaty 
termination affects only U.S. domestic law but not international law, a 
matter I take up when I take up customary international law.) 
If the treaty is permanent in effect, then it is a voluntary surrender of 
sovereignty and similar to the absorption of one country by another— 
though in this case only a partial one—limited to the extent of the 
authority granted the law-enacting international institution.  (Think of 
the surrender of full but not all sovereignty by the states of the United
States in ratifying the Constitution.) 
The constitutional question is more vexed.  Would such a surrender of
some degree of sovereignty by treaty be constitutional, or would a treaty 
delegating lawmaking authority to a supranational body be constitutionally 
invalid? Although this issue is surely not free from doubt, it would seem 
that if the treaty were deemed to have delegated lawmaking authority to 
the international institution, the treaty would be constitutionally ultra 
vires, at least with respect to the international institution’s domestic
authority. Although the constitutional limits on Congress’s and the 
President’s authority to delegate lawmaking functions—authoritative 
settlement of obligations—to other institutions and to private parties is a 
hotly contested one,17 if there are such limits, delegations to supranational
bodies would be a prime candidate for violation of those limits.18 
17. On delegations to private parties, see Washington ex rel Seattle Trust Co. v. 
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); 
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).  On delegations to private parties to 
enforce federal law through qui tam actions, see Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).  On delegation of legislative power to non-
legislative bodies, see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Delegation
Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003). 
18. There are some who see no constitutional problem with treaties’ delegating
domestic legal authority to international tribunals.  I find that view quite problematic 
given the Constitution’s carefully wrought structures for lawmaking. 
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With respect to the treaty’s conveying authority to obligate the United
States internationally, however, the question becomes whether the 
Constitution permits the United States to surrender by treaty part of its 
sovereignty.  For unlike treaties under which the United States undertakes
specific obligations, the treaties we are now considering represent 
agreements to be bound by whatever obligations the international tribunal
declares.  Some might view these two types of treaties as differing only
by matters of degree, with agreement on specific obligations at one end 
of a continuum (no loss of sovereignty); agreement to whatever rules an
international body formulates on a specific matter further along the 
continuum (partial loss of sovereignty); and agreement to whatever rules 
an international body formulates on any subject whatsoever at the far
end of continuum (full loss of sovereignty).  Others might see these 
differences as differences of kind rather than differences of degree; and 
they would probably deem valid only treaties undertaking specific
obligations and reject as unconstitutional any treaties purporting to 
delegate lawmaking authority to an international body.19 
Even if such treaties are constitutionally valid, and sovereignty can be
surrendered by treaty, it is important to keep in mind that this is so only 
with respect to international matters.  Any attempt to give an international
tribunal authority to settle domestic matters would, as argued above, 
look to be inconsistent with the Constitution’s allocation of lawmaking 
authority and thus be unconstitutional. Sovereignty on domestic matters— 
where final authority to settle domestic obligations resides—is in the 
Constitution and the structure it contemplates, and treaties remain subordinate 
to it insofar as domestic obligations are concerned. 
Treaties are one source of international law. For some, they are
perhaps the only source.  (Again, no one disputes that morality governs 
relations between nations and their citizens; the question is where the
mechanisms for authoritative settlement of international obligations 
reside.) But others recognize something called “customary international 
law,” or CIL. 
I hesitate to wade into the vexed waters of controversies over CIL, so I 
will only dip a toe or two into them. One form of CIL, the least
controversial, is represented by the behavior of states that is intended to 
conform to norms that other states also recognize and comply with, such 
as norms regarding the proper treatment of ambassadors, norms regarding 
surrender in battle, and so on. These norms might be conceptualized as 
19. In conversation, my colleague Mike Ramsey, Professor of Law, University of 
San Diego School of Law, stated that he takes a more permissive view on delegations of 
lawmaking authority to international bodies when the topic is the international legal 
obligations of the United States than he does when the topic is domestic legal consequences. 
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arising from implied agreements and thus may be assimilated to treaty-
based obligations. (Some could also be regarded as merely concretized
moral obligations arising from others’ justifiable expectations.) 
But there are other conceptions of CIL that move beyond norms to 
which states have explicitly or implicitly assented.  Some even find CIL
in the mere behavior of some sufficient number of states.  Some find
CIL in the pronouncements of the international lawyers, international 
tribunals, and other international organizations. 
Eighteenth century views of CIL—the “Law of Nations”—was some
amalgam of natural law and custom.20  If for natural law we substitute
morality, and for custom we substitute norms of behavior treated by all
parties as binding, we get a picture of CIL that does not extend beyond
what we have thus far discussed.  Nations were only bound by their 
voluntary behavior or by morality—which, though not a matter of 
choice, nonetheless can never be evaded.  Modern views of CIL, however, 
that extend its sources to the behavior of some sufficient number of 
states or to the pronouncements of international lawyers and tribunals, 
pose very serious issues. 
First, is it at all clear that we—the citizens of the United States—have 
accepted these bodies as authoritative for settling our international
obligations? 
Second, if we have not accepted such bodies as authoritative, should 
we do so? Are we morally better off if we accept their determinations of 
our international obligations, or are we better off following our own 
moral lights and eschewing authoritative settlement that is beyond our 
control?  I am sure different people will answer these questions differently. 
My point is that these are the questions that need to be answered.
Indeed, even if we have accepted some international bodies as authorities 
regarding our international obligations, such acceptance can always be 
withdrawn if we believe anarchy to be morally preferable to authoritative 
settlement as it is currently realized.  All law rests on moment-to-
moment acceptance and is quite durable only because of the moral
superiority of authoritative settlement over anarchy within a large range 
of authoritative settlement mechanisms.  But when the mechanism seems 
suspect, and the moral costs of anarchy sufficiently low, one has moral
reason to withhold acceptance of the mechanism’s settlement authority. 
20. See RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 344−46. 
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In light of this analysis, it is worth considering the constitutional status
of CIL. As I understand the issue, there are roughly three views of CIL’s
constitutional status.  One view is that CIL is federal law, applicable in
domestic courts, and preemptive of state and local law.  In other words, 
on this view, CIL is on a par with treaties.  (On all three views, CIL is 
not federal law if it conflicts with the Constitution—though to the extent 
CIL is “law” and not just morality, its apparatus for authoritative 
settlement are not those processes for legislation described in the 
Constitution.)
At the other end of the spectrum is the view that denies that CIL is 
federal law.21 On this view, CIL could be incorporated by reference in a
statute and enter our domestic law that way. Otherwise, CIL is not the 
law of the United States, and neither the courts nor the President has 
constitutional authority—much less a constitutional obligation—to 
enforce it.  (Even incorporation by reference might be unconstitutional if 
the incorporation went beyond the CIL existing at the time of 
incorporation and extended to norms of CIL that are not based on norm-
accepting behavior by the U.S. and become recognized or declared by 
some non-U.S. institution at a later date.  Such dynamic incorporations 
of CIL could be seen as delegations of lawmaking authority to institutions
beyond those of federal government and beyond our shores.)22 
The middle view is that CIL has no domestic status as preemptive 
federal law but may bind the President, who can be censured or even
impeached for noncompliance.  Again, on this view, as on the preceding
view, the United States is not fully sovereign, as authoritative settlement
on some matters occurs through institutions that we accept as
authoritative but that are not our own.
Let me conclude by briefly touching on another issue that bears some
relationship to my main topic and that has been the source of some 
recent contention—the citation of foreign authorities in U.S. constitutional 
cases.23  To me, the issues in any constitutional case are simply (1) what 
was the intended meaning of the constitutional clause in question and
(2) how does that intended meaning apply to the facts at hand. It is difficult 
to see how, say, a 2001 decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
can be relevant to the intended meaning of a constitutional amendment
21. For a comprehensive defense of this position, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762 (2009). 
22. For an illuminating discussion of dynamic incorporation of another sovereign’s 
laws, see Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
103 (2008). 
23. See, e.g., the debate between the dissent and majority, in Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005); Id. at 575−78 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); id. at 622−28
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ratified in 1791.  For that matter, it is difficult to see how a U.S. Supreme
Court decision subsequent to 1791 can be relevant unless one believes 
the justices possessed evidence of the intended meaning that is no longer
available. (The decision can, of course, be treated as the authoritative
settlement of that intended meaning if stare decisis prevails in
constitutional decision making; but that is different from treating the 
decision as relevant evidence of that meaning.) 
On the other hand, depending upon what that intended meaning is, 
later events might bear on its application.  If the constitutional authors 
intended by some term such as “cruel” to refer to the “real nature” of 
cruelty—as, for example, Ronald Dworkin believes24—then post-1791
philosophical treatises, and perhaps learned opinion in general, might be 
probative of whether some practice is really cruel.  The decisions of 
foreign courts or even foreign popular opinion could have some probative
value—though I would think there would be much better sources of 
evidence than these. After all, what one would want to know is whether
the issue involved in the constitutional case—say, the true nature of 
cruelty and whether a given punishment manifests it—was the same 
issue that the foreign court decided and about which foreign opinion was 
polled.  Beyond that, one would be more interested, not in the decision’s 
or opinion’s bottom line, but in the quality of reasoning that produced it. 
Good reasoning is good reasoning whoever engages in it and where.
That said, I have not been impressed with the use thus far of foreign 
citations in deciding U.S. constitutional cases. 
24. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 72−81 (1996). 
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